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Abstract 
We propose several econometric measures of connectedness based on principal-components 
analysis and Granger-causality networks, and apply them to the monthly returns of hedge 
funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies. We find that all four sectors have 
become highly interrelated over the past decade, likely increasing the level of systemic risk in 
the finance and insurance industries through a complex and time-varying network of 
relationships. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem 
to contain predictive power in out-of-sample tests. Our results show an asymmetry in the 
degree of connectedness among the four sectors, with banks playing a much more important 
role in transmitting shocks than other financial institutions. 
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1 Introduction
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 has created renewed interest in systemic risk, a concept
originally associated with bank runs and currency crises, but which is now applied more
broadly to shocks to other parts of the financial system, e.g., commercial paper, money
market funds, repurchase agreements, consumer finance, and OTC derivatives markets. Al-
though most regulators and policymakers believe that systemic events can be identified after
the fact, a precise definition of systemic risk seems remarkably elusive, even after the demise
of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008, the government takeover of AIG in that same
year, the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012.
By definition, systemic risk involves the financial system, a collection of interconnected
institutions that have mutually beneficial business relationships through which illiquidity,
insolvency, and losses can quickly propagate during periods of financial distress. In this
paper, we propose two econometric methods to capture this connectedness—principal com-
ponents analysis and Granger-causality networks—and apply them to the monthly returns of
four types of financial institutions: hedge funds, and publicly traded banks, broker/dealers,
and insurance companies. We use principal components analysis to estimate the number
and importance of common factors driving the returns of these financial institutions, and
we use pairwise Granger-causality tests to identify the network of statistically significant
Granger-causal relations among these institutions.
Our focus on hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies is not coin-
cidental, but is motivated by the extensive business ties between them, many of which have
emerged only in the last decade. For example, insurance companies have had little to do with
hedge funds until recently. However, as they moved more aggressively into non-core activities
such as insuring financial products, credit-default swaps, derivatives trading, and investment
management, insurers created new business units that competed directly with banks, hedge
funds, and broker/dealers. These activities have potential implications for systemic risk when
conducted on a large scale (see Geneva Association, 2010). Similarly, the banking industry
has been transformed over the last 10 years, not only with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999, but also through financial innovations like securitization that have blurred
the distinction between loans, bank deposits, securities, and trading strategies. The types
of business relationships between these sectors have also changed, with banks and insurers
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providing credit to hedge funds but also competing against them through their own propri-
etary trading desks, and hedge funds using insurers to provide principal protection on their
funds while simultaneously competing with them by offering capital-market-intermediated
insurance such as catastrophe-linked bonds.
For banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies, we confine our attention to publicly
listed entities and use their monthly equity returns in our analysis. For hedge funds—
which are private partnerships—we use their monthly reported net-of-fee fund returns. Our
emphasis on market returns is motivated by the desire to incorporate the most current
information in our measures; market returns reflect information more rapidly than non-
market-based measures such as accounting variables. In our empirical analysis, we consider
the individual returns of the 25 largest entities in each of the four sectors, as well as asset- and
market-capitalization-weighted return indexes of these sectors. While smaller institutions can
also contribute to systemic risk,1 such risks should be most readily observed in the largest
entities. We believe our study is the first to capture the network of causal relationships
between the largest financial institutions across these four sectors.
Our empirical findings show that linkages within and across all four sectors are highly
dynamic over the past decade, varying in quantifiable ways over time and as a function of
market conditions. Over time, all four sectors have become highly interrelated, increasing the
channels through which shocks can propagate throughout the finance and insurance sectors.
These patterns are all the more striking in light of the fact that our analysis is based on
monthly returns data. In a framework where all markets clear and past information is
fully impounded into current prices, we should not be able to detect significant statistical
relationships on a monthly timescale.
Our principal components estimates and Granger-causality tests also point to an impor-
tant asymmetry in the connections: the returns of banks and insurers seem to have more
significant impact on the returns of hedge funds and broker/dealers than vice versa. This
asymmetry became highly significant prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, raising the
possibility that these measures may be useful out-of-sample indicators of systemic risk. This
pattern suggests that banks may be more central to systemic risk than the so-called shadow
banking system. One obvious explanation for this asymmetry is the fact that banks lend
1For example, in a recent study commissioned by the G-20, the IMF (2009) determined that systemically
important institutions are not limited to those that are the largest, but also include others that are highly
interconnected and that can impair the normal functioning of financial markets when they fail.
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capital to other financial institutions, hence the nature of their relationships with other
counterparties is not symmetric. Also, by competing with other financial institutions in
non-traditional businesses, banks and insurers may have taken on risks more appropriate
for hedge funds, leading to the emergence of a “shadow hedge-fund system” in which sys-
temic risk cannot be managed by traditional regulatory instruments. Yet another possible
interpretation is that because they are more highly regulated, banks and insurers are more
sensitive to value-at-risk changes through their capital requirements, hence their behavior
may generate endogenous feedback loops with perverse externalities and spillover effects to
other financial institutions.
In Section 2 we provide a brief review of the literature on systemic risk measurement, and
describe our proposed measures in Section 3. The data used in our analysis is summarized
in Section 4, and the empirical results are reported in Sections 5. The practical relevance of
our measures as early warning signals is considered in Section 6, and we conclude in Section
7.
2 Literature review
Since there is currently no widely accepted definition of systemic risk, a comprehensive
literature review of this rapidly evolving research area is difficult to provide. Like Justice
Potter Stewart’s description of pornography, systemic risk seems to be hard to define but
we think we know it when we see it. Such an intuitive definition is hardly amenable to
measurement and analysis, a pre-requisite for macroprudential regulation of systemic risk.
A more formal definition is any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public
confidence in the financial system.2 Under this definition, the stock market crash of October
19, 1987 was not systemic, but the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010 was because the latter event
called into question the credibility of the price discovery process, unlike the former. Similarly,
2For an alternate perspective, see De Bandt and Hartmann’s (2000) review of the systemic risk literature,
which led them to the following definition:
A systemic crisis can be defined as a systemic event that affects a considerable number of
financial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely impairing the general well-
functioning of the financial system. While the “special” character of banks plays a major role,
we stress that systemic risk goes beyond the traditional view of single banks’ vulnerability to
depositor runs. At the heart of the concept is the notion of “contagion”, a particularly strong
propagation of failures from one institution, market or system to another.
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the 2006 collapse of the $9 billion hedge fund Amaranth Advisors was not systemic, but the
1998 collapse of the $5 billion hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was,
because the latter event affected a much broader swath of financial markets and threatened
the viability of several important financial institutions, unlike the former. And the failure of
a few regional banks is not systemic, but the failure of a single highly interconnected money
market fund can be.
While this definition does seem to cover most, if not all, of the historical examples of
“systemic” events, it also implies that the risk of such events is multifactorial and unlikely to
be captured by any single metric. After all, how many ways are there of measuring “stabil-
ity” and “public confidence”? If we consider financial crises the realization of systemic risk,
then Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) volume encompassing eight centuries of crises is the new
reference standard. If we focus, instead, on the four “L”s of financial crises—leverage, liquid-
ity, losses, and linkages—several measures of the first three already exist.3 However, the one
common thread running through all truly systemic events is that they involve the financial
system, i.e., the connections and interactions among financial stakeholders. Therefore, any
measure of systemic risk must capture the degree of connectivity of market participants to
some extent. Therefore, in this paper we choose to focus our attention on the fourth “L”:
linkages.
From a theoretical perspective, it is now well established that the likelihood of major
financial dislocation is related to the degree of correlation among the holdings of financial
institutions, how sensitive they are to changes in market prices and economic conditions (and
the directionality, if any, of those sensitivities, i.e., causality), how concentrated the risks are
among those financial institutions, and how closely linked they are with each other and the
rest of the economy.4 Three measures have been proposed recently to estimate these linkages:
3With respect to leverage, in the wake of the sweeping Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill of 2010, fi-
nancial institutions are now obligated to provide considerably greater transparency to regulators, including
the disclosure of positions and leverage. There are many measures of liquidity for publicly traded secu-
rities, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chordia, Roll
and Subrahmanyam (2000, 2001, 2002), Glosten and Harris (1988), Lillo, Farmer, and Mantegna (2003),
Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2001), Lo and Wang (2000), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Sadka (2006).
For private partnerships such as hedge funds, Lo (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) propose
serial correlation as a measure of their liquidity, i.e., more liquid funds have less serial correlation. Billio,
Getmansky and Pelizzon (2011) use Large-Small and VIX factors as liquidity proxies in hedge fund analysis.
And the systemic implications of losses are captured by CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010) and SES
(Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2011).
4See, for example Acharya and Richardson (2009), Allen and Gale (1994, 1998, 2000), Battiston, Delli
Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
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Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2010) conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, and Richardson’s (2011) systemic expected shortfall (SES), and Huang, Zhou, and
Zhu’s (2011) distressed insurance premium (DIP). SES measures the expected loss to each
financial institution conditional on the entire set of institutions’ poor performance; CoVaR
measures the value-at-risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on other institutions
experiencing financial distress; and DIP measures the insurance premium required to cover
distressed losses in the banking system.
The common theme among these three closely related measures is the magnitude of losses
during periods when many institutions are simultaneously distressed. While this theme may
seem to capture systemic exposures, it does so only to the degree that systemic losses are
well represented in the historical data. But during periods of rapid financial innovation,
newly connected parts of the financial system may not have experienced simultaneous losses,
despite the fact that their connectedness implies an increase in systemic risk. For example,
prior to the 2007–2009 crisis, extreme losses among monoline insurance companies did not
coincide with comparable losses among hedge funds invested in mortgage-backed securities
because the two sectors had only recently become connected through insurance contracts on
collateralized debt obligations. Moreover, measures based on probabilities invariably depend
on market volatility, and during periods of prosperity and growth, volatility is typically
lower than in periods of distress. This implies lower estimates of systemic risk until after a
volatility spike occurs, which reduces the usefulness of such a measure as an early warning
indicator.
Of course, aggregate loss probabilities depend on correlations through the variance of
the loss distribution (which is comprised of the variances and covariances of the individual
institutions in the financial system). Over the last decade, correlations between distinct
sectors of the financial system like hedge funds and the banking industry tend to become
much higher during and after a systemic shock occurs, not before. Therefore, by conditioning
on extreme losses, measures like CoVaR and SES are estimated on data that reflect unusually
high correlations among financial institutions. This, in turn, implies that during non-crisis
periods, correlation will play little role in indicating a build-up of systemic risk using such
measures.
Our approach is to simply measure correlation directly and unconditionally—through
Gray (2009), Rajan (2006), Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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principal components analysis and by pairwise Granger-causality tests—and use these met-
rics to gauge the degree of connectedness of the financial system. During normal times,
such connectivity may be lower than during periods of distress, but by focusing on uncon-
ditional measures of connectedness, we are able to detect new linkages between parts of the
financial system that have nothing to do with simultaneous losses. In fact, while aggregate
correlations may decline during bull markets—implying lower conditional loss probabilities—
our measures show increased unconditional correlations among certain sectors and financial
institutions, yielding finer-grain snapshots of linkages throughout the financial system.
Moreover, our Granger-causality-network measures have, by definition, a time dimension
that is missing in conditional loss probability measures which are based on contemporane-
ous relations. In particular, Granger causality is defined as a predictive relation between
past values of one variable and future values of another. Our out-of-sample analysis shows
that these lead/lag relations are important, even after accounting for leverage measures,
contemporaneous connections, and liquidity.
In summary, our two measures of connectedness complement the three conditional loss-
probability-based measures, CoVaR, SES, and DIP in providing direct estimates of the sta-
tistical connectivity of a network of financial institutions’ asset returns.
Our work is also related to Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) who investigate contagion
from lagged bank- and broker-returns to hedge-fund returns. We consider these relations as
well, but also consider the possibility of reverse contagion, i.e., causal effects from hedge funds
to banks and broker/dealers. Moreover, we add a fourth sector—insurance companies—to
the mix, which has become increasingly important, particularly during the most recent
financial crisis.
Our paper is also related to Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2011) who show that the structure
of the network—where linkages among institutions are based on the commonality of asset
holdings—matters in the generation and propagation of systemic risk. In our work, we
empirically estimate the network structure of financial institutions generated by stock-return
interconnections.
3 Measures of connectedness
In this section we present two measures of connectedness that are designed to capture changes
in correlation and causality among financial institutions. In Section 3.1, we construct a
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measure based on principal components analysis to identify increased correlation among
the asset returns of financial institutions. To assign directionality to these correlations, in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we use pairwise linear and nonlinear Granger-causality tests to estimate
the network of statistically significant relations among financial institutions.
3.1 Principal components
Increased commonality among the asset returns of banks, broker/dealers, insurers, and hedge
funds can be empirically detected by using principal components analysis (PCA), a technique
in which the asset returns of a sample of financial institutions are decomposed into orthogonal
factors of decreasing explanatory power (see Muirhead, 1982 for an exposition of PCA). More
formally, let Ri be the stock return of institution i, i = 1, . . . , N , let the system’s aggregate
return be represented by the sum RS =
∑
iR
i, and let E [Ri] = µi and Var[R
i] = σ2i . Then
we have:
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
σiσjE [zizj ] , where zk ≡ (R
k − µk)/σk , k = i, j , (1)
where zk is the standardized return of institution k and σ
2
S is the variance of the system. We
now introduce N zero-mean uncorrelated variables ζk for which
E [ζkζ l] =
{
λk if k = l
0 if k 6= l
(2)
and all the higher order co-moments are equal to those of the z’s, where λk is the k-th
eigenvalue. We express the z’s as a linear combination of the ζk’s
zi =
N∑
k=1
Likζk, (3)
where Lik is a factor loading for ζk for an institution i. Thus we have
E [zizj ] =
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
LikLjlE [ζkζ l] =
N∑
k=1
LikLjkλk (4)
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
σiσjLikLjkλk . (5)
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PCA yields a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of returns of the N financial
institutions into the orthonormal matrix of loadings L (eigenvectors of the correlation matrix
of returns) and the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues Λ. Because the first few eigenvalues usually
explain most of the variation of the system, we focus our attention on only a subset n<N
of them. This subset captures a larger portion of the total volatility when the majority of
returns tend to move together, as is often associated with crisis periods. Therefore, periods
when this subset of principal components explains more than some fraction H of the total
volatility are indicative of increased interconnectedness between financial institutions.5
Defining the total risk of the system as Ω ≡
∑N
k=1 λk and the risk associated with the
first n principal components as ωn ≡
∑n
k=1 λk, we compare the ratio of the two (i.e., the
Cumulative Risk Fraction) to the pre-specified critical threshold level H to capture periods
of increased interconnectedness:
ωn
Ω
≡ hn ≥ H . (6)
When the system is highly interconnected, a small number n of N principal components
can explain most of the volatility in the system, hence hn will exceed the threshold H .
By examining the time variation in the magnitudes of hn, we are able to detect increasing
correlation among institutions, i.e., increased linkages and integration as well as similarities
in risk exposures, which can contribute to systemic risk.
The contribution PCASi,n of institution i to the risk of the system—conditional on a
strong common component across the returns of all financial institutions (hn ≥ H)—is a
univariate measure of connectedness for each company i, i.e.:
PCASi,n =
1
2
σ2i
σ2S
∂σ2S
∂σ2i
∣∣∣∣
hn≥H
. (7)
It is easy to show that this measure also corresponds to the exposure of institution i to
the total risk of the system, measured as the weighted average of the square of the factor
loadings of the single institution i to the first n principal components, where the weights are
5In our framework, H is determined statistically as the threshold level that exhibits a statistically sig-
nificant change in explaining the fraction of total volatility with respect to previous periods. The statistical
significance is determined through simulation as described in Appendix A.
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simply the eigenvalues. In fact:
PCASi,n =
1
2
σ2i
σ2S
∂σ2S
∂σ2i
∣∣∣∣
hn≥H
=
n∑
k=1
σ2i
σ2S
L2ikλk
∣∣∣∣
hn≥H
. (8)
Intuitively, since we are focusing on endogenous risk, this is both the contribution and the
exposure of the i-th institution to the overall risk of the system given a strong common
component across the returns of all institutions.
In Online Appendix O.1 we show how, in a Gaussian framework, this measure is related to
the co-kurtosis of the multivariate distribution. When fourth co-moments are finite, PCAS
captures the contribution of the i-th institution to the multivariate tail dynamics of the
system.
3.2 Linear Granger causality
To investigate the dynamic propagation of shocks to the system, it is important to measure
not only the degree of connectedness between financial institutions, but also the directionality
of such relationships. To that end, we propose using Granger causality, a statistical notion
of causality based on the relative forecast power of two time series. Time series j is said
to “Granger-cause” time series i if past values of j contain information that helps predict
i above and beyond the information contained in past values of i alone. The mathematical
formulation of this test is based on linear regressions of Rit+1 on R
i
t and R
j
t .
Specifically, let Rit and R
j
t be two stationary time series, and for simplicity assume they
have zero mean. We can represent their linear inter-relationships with the following model:
Rit+1 = a
iRit + b
ijRjt + e
i
t+1 ,
Rjt+1 = a
jRjt + b
jiRit + e
j
t+1
(9)
where eit+1 and e
j
t+1 are two uncorrelated white noise processes, and a
i, aj, bij , bji are coef-
ficients of the model. Then j Granger-causes i when bij is different from zero. Similarly, i
Granger-causes j when bji is different from zero. When both of these statements are true,
there is a feedback relationship between the time series.6
6We use the “Bayesian Information Criterion” (BIC; see Schwarz, 1978) as the model-selection criterion
for determining the number of lags in our analysis. Moreover, we perform F -tests of the null hypotheses
that the coefficients {bij} or {bji} (depending on the direction of Granger causality under consideration) are
9
In an informationally efficient financial market, short-term asset-price changes should
not be related to other lagged variables,7 hence a Granger-causality test should not detect
any causality. However, in the presence of value-at-risk constraints or other market frictions
such as transactions costs, borrowing constraints, costs of gathering and processing informa-
tion, and institutional restrictions on shortsales, we may find Granger causality among price
changes of financial assets. Moreover, this type of predictability may not easily be arbitraged
away precisely because of the presence of such frictions. Therefore, the degree of Granger
causality in asset returns can be viewed as a proxy for return-spillover effects among market
participants as suggested by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011), Battiston et al. (2009),
and Buraschi et al. (2010). As this effect is amplified, the tighter are the connections and
integration among financial institutions, heightening the severity of systemic events as shown
by Castiglionesi, Periozzi, and Lorenzoni (2009) and Battiston et al. (2009).
Accordingly, we propose a Granger-causality measure of connectedness to capture the
lagged propagation of return spillovers in the financial system, i.e., the network of Granger-
causal relations among financial institutions.
We consider a GARCH(1,1) baseline model of returns:
Rit = µi + σitǫ
i
t , ǫ
i
t ∼ WN(0, 1)
σ2it = ωi + αi
(
Rit−1 − µi
)2
+ βiσ
2
it−1 (10)
conditional on the system information:
ISt−1 = S
({{
Riτ
}t−1
τ=−∞
}N
i=1
)
, (11)
where µi, ωi, αi, and βi are coefficients of the model, and S(·) represents the sigma algebra.
Since our interest is in obtaining a measure of connectedness, we focus on the dynamic
propagation of shocks from one institution to others, controlling for return autocorrelation
for that institution.
equal to zero.
7Of course, predictability may be the result of time-varying expected returns, which is perfectly consistent
with dynamic rational expectations equilibria, but it is difficult to reconcile short-term predictability (at
monthly and higher frequencies) with such explanations. See, for example, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004, Section 3) for a calibration exercise in which an equilibrium two-state Markov switching model is used
to generate autocorrelation in asset returns, with little success.
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A rejection of a linear Granger-causality test as defined in (9) on R˜it=
Ri
t
σ̂it
, where σ̂it is
estimated with a GARCH(1,1) model to control for heteroskedasticity, is the simplest way to
statistically identify the network of Granger-causal relations among institutions, as it implies
that returns of the i-th institution linearly depend on the past returns of the j-th institution:
E
[
Rit
∣∣ISt−1] = E
[
Rit
∣∣∣∣{(Riτ − µi)2}t−2
τ=−∞
, Rit−1, R
j
t−1,
{(
Rjτ − µj
)2}t−2
τ=−∞
]
. (12)
Now define the following indicator of causality:
(j → i) =
{
1 if j Granger causes i
0 otherwise
(13)
and define (j → j) ≡ 0. These indicator functions may be used to define the connections
of the network of N financial institutions, from which we can then construct the following
network-based measures of connectedness.
1. Degree of Granger Causality. Denote by the degree of Granger causality (DGC) the
fraction of statistically significant Granger-causality relationships among all N(N−1)
pairs of N financial institutions:
DGC ≡
1
N (N − 1)
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(j → i) . (14)
The risk of a systemic event is high when DGC exceeds a threshold K which is well
above normal sampling variation as determined by our Monte Carlo simulation proce-
dure (See Appendix B).
2. Number of Connections. To assess the systemic importance of single institutions,
we define the following simple counting measures, where S represents the system:
#Out : (j → S)|DGC≥K =
1
N−1
∑
i 6=j (j → i)|DGC≥K
#In : (S → j)|DGC≥K =
1
N−1
∑
i 6=j (i→ j)|DGC≥K
#In+Out : (j ←→ S)|DGC≥K =
1
2(N−1)
∑
i 6=j (i→ j) + (j → i)|DGC≥K .
(15)
#Out measures the number of financial institutions that are significantly Granger-
caused by institution j, #In measures the number of financial institutions that signif-
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icantly Granger-cause institution j, and #In+Out is the sum of these two measures.
3. Sector-Conditional Connections. Sector-conditional connections are similar to
(15), but they condition on the type of financial institution. GivenM types (four in our
case: banks, broker/dealers, insurers, and hedge funds), indexed by α, β = 1, . . . ,M ,
we have the following three measures:
#Out-to-Other :(
(j|α)→
∑
β 6=α
(S|β)
)∣∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
=
1
(M−1)N/M
∑
β 6=α
∑
i 6=j
(
(j|α)→ (i|β)
)∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
(16)
#In-from-Other :(∑
β 6=α
(S|β)→ (j|α)
)∣∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
=
1
(M−1)N/M
∑
β 6=α
∑
i 6=j
(
(i|β)→ (j|α)
)∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
(17)
#In+Out-Other :(
(j|α)←→
∑
β 6=α
(S|β)
)∣∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
=
∑
β 6=α
∑
i 6=j
(
(i|β)→ (j|α)
)
+
(
(j|α)→ (i|β)
)∣∣∣∣
DGC≥K
2(M−1)N/M
(18)
where #Out-to-Other is the number of other types of financial institutions that are
significantly Granger-caused by institution j, #In-from-Other is the number of other
types of financial institutions that significantly Granger-cause institution j, and#In+Out-
Other is the sum of the two.
4. Closeness. Closeness measures the shortest path between a financial institution and
all other institutions reachable from it, averaged across all other financial institutions.
To construct this measure, we first define j as weakly causally C-connected to i if
there exists a causality path of length C between i and j, i.e., there exists a sequence
of nodes k1, . . . , kC−1 such that:
(j → k1)× (k1 → k2) · · · × (kC−1 → i) ≡ (j
C
→ i) = 1 . (19)
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Denote by Cji the length of the shortest C-connection between j to i:
Cji ≡ min
C
{
C ∈ [1, N−1] : (j
C
→ i) = 1
}
, (20)
where we set Cji = N−1 if (j
C
→ i)=0 for all C∈ [1, N−1]. The closeness measure for
institution j is then defined as:
CjS|DGC≥K =
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
Cji(j
C
→ i)
∣∣∣
DGC≥K
. (21)
5. Eigenvector Centrality. The eigenvector centrality measures the importance of a
financial institution in a network by assigning relative scores to financial institutions
based on how connected they are to the rest of the network. First define the adjacency
matrix A as the matrix with elements:
[A]ji = (j → i) . (22)
The eigenvector centrality measure is the eigenvector v of the adjacency matrix asso-
ciated with eigenvalue 1, i.e., in matrix form:
Av = v . (23)
Equivalently, the eigenvector centrality of j can be written as the sum of the eigenvector
centralities of institutions caused by j:
vj |DGC≥K =
N∑
i=1
[A]ji vi|DGC≥K . (24)
If the adjacency matrix has non-negative entries, a unique solution is guaranteed to
exist by the Perron-Frobenius theorem.
3.3 Nonlinear Granger causality
The standard definition of Granger causality is linear, hence it cannot capture nonlinear and
higher-order causal relationships. This limitation is potentially relevant for our purposes
13
since we are interested in whether an increase in riskiness (e.g., volatility) in one financial
institution leads to an increase in the riskiness of another. To capture these higher-order
effects, we consider a second causality measure in this section that we call nonlinear Granger
causality, which is based on a Markov-switching model of asset returns.8 This nonlinear
extension of Granger causality can capture the effect of one financial institution’s return
on the future mean and variance of another financial institution’s return, allowing us to
detect the volatility-based interconnectedness hypothesized by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand
(2011), for example.
More formally, consider the case of hedge funds and banks, and let Zh,t and Zb,t be
Markov chains that characterize the expected returns (µ) and volatilities (σ) of the two
financial institutions, respectively, i.e.:
Rj,t = µj(Zj,t) + σj(Zj,t)uj,t, (25)
where Rj,t is the excess return of institution j in period t, j = h, b, uj,t is independently and
identically distributed (IID) over time, and Zj,t is a two-state Markov chain with transition
probability matrix Pz,j for institution j.
We can test the nonlinear causal interdependence between these two series by testing the
two hypotheses of causality from Zh,t to Zb,t and vice versa (the general case of nonlinear
Granger-causality estimation is considered in the Appendix C). In fact, the joint stochastic
process Yt ≡ (Zh,t, Zb,t) is itself a first-order Markov chain with transition probabilities:
P (Yt | Yt−1) = P (Zh,t, Zb,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) , (26)
where all the relevant information from the past history of the process at time t is represented
by the previous state, i.e., regimes at time t−1. Under the additional assumption that the
transition probabilities do not vary over time, the process can be defined as a Markov chain
with stationary transition probabilities, summarized by the transition matrix P. We can
8Markov-switching models have been used to investigate systemic risk by Chan, Getmansky, Haas and
Lo (2006) and to measure value-at-risk by Billio and Pelizzon (2000).
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then decompose the joint transition probabilities as:
P (Yt|Yt−1) = P (Zh,t, Zb,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) (27)
= P (Zb,t |Zh,t, Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1)× P (Zh,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) .
According to this decomposition and the results in Appendix C, we run the following two
tests of nonlinear Granger causality:
1. Granger non-causality from Zh,t to Zb,t (Zh,t ; Zb,t):
Decompose the joint probability:
P (Zh,t, Zb,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) = P (Zh,t |Zb,t, Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) ×
P (Zb,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) . (28)
If Zh,t ; Zb,t, the last term becomes
P (Zb,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) = P (Zb,t |Zb,t−1) . (29)
2. Granger non-causality from Zb,t to Zh,t (Zb,t ; Zh,t):
This requires that if Zb,t ; Zh,t, then:
P (Zh,t |Zh,t−1, Zb,t−1) = P (Zh,t |Zh,t−1) . (30)
4 The data
For the main analysis, we use monthly returns data for hedge funds, broker/dealers, banks,
and insurers, described in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Summary statistics are
provided in Section 4.3.
4.1 Hedge funds
We use individual hedge-fund data from the TASS Tremont database. We use the September
30, 2009 snapshot of the data, which includes 8,770 hedge funds in both Live and Defunct
databases.
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Our hedge-fund index data consists of aggregate hedge-fund index returns from the
CS/Tremont database from January 1994 to December 2008, which are asset-weighted in-
dexes of funds with a minimum of $10 million in assets under management, a minimum
one-year track record, and current audited financial statements. The following strategies are
included in the total aggregate index (hereafter, known as Hedge Funds): Dedicated Short
Bias, Long/Short Equity, Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event Driven, Equity Market Neu-
tral, Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy, and Managed
Futures. The strategy indexes are computed and rebalanced monthly and the universe of
funds is redefined on a quarterly basis. We use net-of-fee monthly excess returns. This
database accounts for survivorship bias in hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh, 2000). Funds in the
TASS Tremont database are similar to the ones used in the CS/Tremont indexes, however,
TASS Tremont does not implement any restrictions on size, track record, or the presence of
audited financial statements.
4.2 Banks, broker/dealers, and insurers
Data for individual banks, broker/dealers, and insurers are obtained from the University
of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices Database, from which we select the
monthly returns of all companies with SIC Codes from 6000 to 6199 (banks), 6200 to 6299
(broker/dealers), and 6300 to 6499 (insurers). We also construct value-weighted indexes
of banks (hereafter, called Banks), broker/dealers (hereafter, called Brokers), and insurers
(hereafter, called Insurers).
4.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports annualized mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum, maximum, me-
dian, skewness, kurtosis, and first-order autocorrelation coefficient ρ1 for individual hedge
funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurers from January 2004 through December 2008. We
choose the 25 largest financial institutions (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds
and average market capitalization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time
period considered) in each of the four index categories. Brokers have the highest annual
mean of 23% and the highest standard deviation of 39%. Hedge funds have the lowest mean,
12%, and the lowest standard deviation, 11%. Hedge funds have the highest first-order
autocorrelation of 0.14, which is particularly striking when compared to the small nega-
16
tive autocorrelations of broker/dealers (−0.02), banks (−0.09), and insurers (−0.06). This
finding is consistent with the hedge-fund industry’s higher exposure to illiquid assets and
return-smoothing (see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004).
We calculate the same statistics for different time periods that will be considered in the
empirical analysis: 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008. These
periods encompass both tranquil, boom, and crisis periods in the sample. For each 36-month
rolling-window time period the largest 25 hedge funds, broker/dealers, insurers, and banks
are included. In the last period, 2006–2008 which is characterized by the recent Financial
Crisis, we observe the lowest mean across all financial institutions: 1%, −5%, −24%, and
−15% for hedge funds, broker/dealers, banks, and insurers, respectively. This period is
also characterized by very large standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis. Moreover, this
period is unique, as all financial institutions exhibit positive first-order autocorrelations.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we implement the measures defined in Section 3 using historical data for
individual company returns corresponding to the four sectors of the finance and insurance
industries described in Section 4. Section 5.1 contains the results of the principal components
analysis applied to returns of individual financial institutions, and Sections 5.2 and 5.3 report
the outcomes of linear and nonlinear Granger-causality tests, respectively, including simple
visualizations via network diagrams.
5.1 Principal components analysis
Since the heart of systemic risk is commonality among multiple institutions, we attempt to
measure commonality through PCA applied to the individual financial and insurance com-
panies described in Section 4 over the whole sample period, 1994–2008. The time-series
results for the Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e., eigenvalues) are presented in Figure 1a. The
time-series graph of eigenvalues for all principal components (PC1, PC2–10, PC11–20, and
PC21–36) shows that the first 20 principal components capture the majority of return vari-
ation during the whole sample, but the relative importance of these groupings varies consid-
erably. The time periods when few principal components explain a larger percentage of total
variation are associated with an increased interconnectedness between financial institutions
17
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Table 1: Summary statistics for monthly returns of individual hedge funds, broker/dealers,
banks, and insurers for the full sample: January 2004 to December 2008, and five time pe-
riods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. The annualized mean,
annualized standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, skewness, kurtosis, and first-
order autocorrelation are reported. We choose 25 largest financial institutions (as determined
by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for broker/dealers, in-
surers, and banks during the time period considered) in each of the four financial institution
sectors.
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as described in Section 3.1. In particular, Figure 1a shows that the first principal component
is very dynamic, capturing from 24% to 43% of return variation, increasing significantly
during crisis periods. The PC1 eigenvalue was increasing from the beginning of the sample,
peaking at 43% in August 1998 during the LTCM crisis, and subsequently decreased. The
PC1 eigenvalue started to increase in 2002 and stayed high through 2005 (the period when
the Federal Reserve intervened and raised interest rates), declining slightly in 2006–2007, and
increasing again in 2008, peaking in October 2008. As a result, the first principal component
explained 37% of return variation over the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. In fact, the first
10 components explained 83% of the return variation over the recent financial crisis, which
was the highest compared to all other sub-periods.
In addition, we tabulate eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the principal components
analysis over five time periods: 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–
2008. The results in Table 2 show that the first 10 principal components capture 67%, 77%,
72%, 73%, and 83% of the variability among financial institutions in these five time periods,
respectively. The first principal component explains 33% of the return variation on average.
The first 10 principal components explain 74% of the return variation on average, and the
first 20 principal components explain 91% of the return variation on average, as shown by
the Cumulative Risk Fractions in Figure 1a.
We also estimate the variance of the system, σ2S, from the GARCH(1,1) model.
9 Figure
1b depicts the system variance from January 2004 to December 2008. Both the system
variance and the Cumulative Risk Fraction increase during the LTCM (August 2008) and
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (October 2008) periods. The correlation between these
two aggregate indicators is 0.41. Not only is the first principal component able to explain
a large proportion of the total variance during these crisis periods, but the system variance
greatly increased as well.
Table 2 contains the mean, minimum, and maximum of our PCAS measures defined in
(8) for the 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008 periods. These
measures are quite persistent over time for all financial and insurance institutions, but we
9For every 36-month window, we calculate the average of returns for all 100 institutions and we estimate
a GARCH(1,1) model on the resulting time series. For each window, we select the GARCH variance of the
last observation. We prefer to report the variance of the system estimated with the GARCH(1,1) model
rather than just the variance estimated for different windows because in this way we have a measure that is
reacting earlier to the shocks. However, even if we use the variance for each window, we still observe similar
dynamics, only smoothed.
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(b)
Figure 1: Principal components analysis of the monthly standardized returns of individ-
ual hedge funds, broker/dealers, banks, and insurers over January 1994 to December 2008:
(a) 36-month rolling-window estimates of the Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e., eigenvalues)
that correspond to the fraction of total variance explained by principal components 1–36
(PC 1, PC 2–10, PC 11–20, and PC 21–36); (b) system variance from the GARCH(1,1)
model.
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Table 2: Mean, minimum, and maximum values for PCAS 1, PCAS 1–10, and PCAS 1–20.
These measures are based on the monthly returns of individual hedge funds, broker/dealers,
banks, and insurers for the five time periods: 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004,
and 2006–2008. Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e., eigenvalues) is calculated for PC 1, PC 1-10,
and PC 1-20 for all five time periods.
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find variation in the sensitivities of the financial sectors to the four principal components.
PCAS 1–20 for broker/dealers, banks, and insurers are on average 0.85, 0.30, and 0.44,
respectively for the first 20 principal components. This is compared to 0.12 for hedge funds,
which represents the lowest average sensitivity out of the four sectors. However, we also
find variation in our PCAS measure for individual hedge funds. For example, the maximum
PCAS 1–20 for hedge funds in the 2006–2008 time period is 1.91.
As a result, hedge funds are not greatly exposed to the overall risk of the system of
financial institutions. Broker/dealers, banks, and insurers have greater PCAS, thus, result
in greater connectedness. However, we still observe large cross-sectional variability, even
among hedge funds.10
We explore the out-of-sample performance of our PCAS measures (individually and
jointly with our Granger-causality-network measures) during the crisis periods in Section
6.
5.2 Linear Granger-causality tests
To fully appreciate the impact of Granger-causal relationships among various financial insti-
tutions, we provide a visualization of the results of linear Granger-causality tests presented
in Section 3.2, applied over 36-month rolling sub-periods to the 25 largest institutions (as
determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for bro-
ker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) in each of the four index
categories.11
The composition of this sample of 100 financial institutions changes over time as assets
under management change, and as financial institutions are added or deleted from the sample.
Granger-causality relationships are drawn as straight lines connecting two institutions, color-
coded by the type of institution that is “causing” the relationship, i.e., the institution at
date-t which Granger-causes the returns of another institution at date t+1. Green indicates
a broker, red indicates a hedge fund, black indicates an insurer, and blue indicates a bank.
Only those relationships significant at the 5% level are depicted. To conserve space, we
10We repeated the analysis by filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH(1,1) model and adjusting
for autocorrelation in hedge funds returns using the algorithm proposed by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004), and the results are qualitatively the same. These results are available upon request.
11Given that hedge-fund returns are only available monthly, we impose a minimum of 36 months to obtain
reliable estimates of Granger-causal relationships. We also used a rolling window of 60 months to control
the robustness of the results. Results are provided upon request.
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tabulate results only for two of the 145 36-month rolling-window sub-periods in Figures 2
and 3: 1994–1996 and 2006–2008. These are representative time-periods encompassing both
tranquil and crisis periods in the sample.12 We see that the number of connections between
different financial institutions dramatically increases from 1994–1996 to 2006–2008.
12To fully appreciate the dynamic nature of these connections, we have created a short animation using
36-month rolling-window network diagrams updated every month from January 1994 to December 2008,
which can be viewed at http://web.mit.edu/alo/www.
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For our five time periods: (1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–
2008), we also provide summary statistics for the monthly returns of the 100 largest (with
respect to market value and AUM) financial institutions in Table 3, including the asset-
weighted autocorrelation, the normalized number of connections,13 and the total number of
connections.
We find that Granger-causality relationships are highly dynamic among these financial
institutions. Results are presented in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3. For example, the total
number of connections between financial institutions was 583 in the beginning of the sample
(1994–1996), but it more than doubled to 1,244 at the end of the sample (2006–2008). We
also find that during and before financial crises the financial system becomes much more
interconnected in comparison to more tranquil periods. For example, the financial system
was highly interconnected during the 1998 LTCM crisis and the most recent Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009. In the relatively tranquil period of 1994–1996, the total number of connec-
tions as a percentage of all possible connections was 6% and the total number of connections
among financial institutions was 583. Just before and during the LTCM 1998 crisis (1996–
1998), the number of connections increased by 50% to 856, encompassing 9% of all possible
connections. In 2002–2004, the total number of connections was just 611 (6% of total pos-
sible connections), and that more than doubled to 1244 connections (13% of total possible
connections) in 2006–2008, which was right before and during the recent Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009 according to Table 3. Both the 1998 LTCM crisis and the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009 were associated with liquidity and credit problems. The increase in intercon-
nections between financial institutions is a significant systemic risk indicator, especially for
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 which experienced the largest number of interconnections
compared to other time-periods.14
The time series of the number of connections as a percent of all possible connections
is depicted in black in Figure 4, against a threshold of 0.055, the 95th percentile of the
simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal relationships, depicted
in red. Following the theoretical framework of Section 3.2, this figure displays the DGC
measure which indicates greater connectedness when DGC exceeds the threshold. According
to Figure 4, the number of connections are large and significant during the 1998 LTCM crisis,
13The normalized number of connections is the fraction of all statistically significant connections (at the
5% level) between the N financial institutions out of all N(N−1) possible connections.
14The results are similar when we adjust for the S&P 500, and are available upon request.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of asset-weighted autocorrelations and linear Granger-causality
relationships (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of the
largest 25 banks, broker/dealers, insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM
for hedge funds and average market capitalization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks
during the time period considered) for five sample periods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001,
2002-2004, and 2006-2008.The normalized number of connections, and the total number of
connections for all financial institutions, hedge funds, broker/dealers, banks, and insurers are
calculated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity
with a GARCH(1,1) model.
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2002–2004 (a period of low interest rates and high leverage among financial institutions),
and the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.
If we compare Figure 4 and Figure 1, we observe that all the aggregate indicators—
the fraction explained by the first PC (h1), the number of connections as a percent of all
possible connections, and the financial system variance from the GARCH model—move
in tandem during the two financial crises of 1998 and 2008, respectively. However, there
are several periods where they move in opposite directions, e.g., 2002–2005. We find that
these measures exhibit statistically significant contemporaneous and lagged correlations. For
example, contemporaneous correlation between h1 and the number of connections is 0.50,
and correlation between system variance and the number of connections is 0.43. However,
these connectedness measures are not perfectly correlated. For example, during 2001–2006,
the system variance was decreasing, but other measures were increasing. As a result, all
these measures seem to be capturing different facets of connectedness, as suggested by the
out-of-sample analysis in Section 6.15
By measuring Granger-causality-network connections among individual financial insti-
tutions, we find that during the 1998 LTCM crisis (1996–1998 period), hedge funds were
greatly interconnected with other hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurers. Their
impact on other financial institutions was substantial, though less than the total impact of
other financial institutions on them. In the aftermath of the crisis (1999–2001 and 2002–
2004 time periods), the number of financial connections decreased, especially links affecting
hedge funds. The total number of connections clearly started to increase just before and
at the beginning of the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (2006–2008 time period). In
that time period, hedge funds had significant bi-lateral relationships with insurers and bro-
ker/dealers. Hedge funds were highly affected by banks (23% of total possible connections),
though they did not reciprocate in affecting the banks (5% of total possible connections).
The number of significant Granger-causal relations from banks to hedge funds, 142, was the
highest between these two sectors across all five sample periods. In comparison, hedge funds
Granger-caused only 31 banks. These results for the largest individual financial institutions
suggest that banks may be of more concern than hedge funds from the perspective of con-
nectedness, though hedge funds may be the “canary in the cage” that first experience losses
15More detailed analysis of the significance of Granger-causal relationships is provided in the robustness
analysis of Appendix B.
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Figure 4: The time series of linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of sta-
tistical significance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, broker/dealers,
insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average mar-
ket capitalization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered)
for 36-month rolling-window sample periods from January 1994 to December 2008. The
number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections (our DGC measure) is
depicted in black against 0.055, the 95% of the simulated distribution obtained under the
hypothesis of no causal relationships depicted in red. The number of connections is esti-
mated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity
with a GARCH(1,1) model.
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when financial crises hit.16
Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return autocorrelations
to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure, hence we report asset-weighted autocorrelations in
Table 3. We find that the asset-weighted autocorrelations for all financial institutions were
negative for the first four time periods, however, in 2006–2008, the period that includes
the recent financial crisis, the autocorrelation becomes positive. When we separate the
asset-weighted autocorrelations by sector, we find that during all periods, hedge-fund asset-
weighted autocorrelations were positive, but were mostly negative for all other financial
institutions.17 However, in the last period (2006–2008), the asset-weighted autocorrelations
became positive for all financial institutions. These results suggest that the period of the
Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exhibited the most illiquidity and connectivity among financial
institutions.
In summary, we find that, on average, all companies in the four sectors we studied have
become highly interrelated and generally less liquid over the past decade, increasing the level
of connectedness in the finance and insurance industries.
To separate contagion and common-factor exposure, we regress each company’s monthly
returns on the S&P 500 and re-run the linear Granger causality tests on the residuals. We
find the same pattern of dynamic interconnectedness between financial institutions, and the
resulting network diagrams are qualitatively similar to those with raw returns, hence we
omit them to conserve space.18 We also explore whether our connectedness measures are
related to return predictability, which we capture via the following factors: inflation, indus-
trial production growth, the Fama-French factors, and liquidity (detailed results are reported
in Online Appendix O.3). We find that our main Granger-causality results still hold after
adjusting for these sources of predictability. It appears that connections between financial
institutions are not contemporaneously priced and cannot be exploited as a trading strategy.
The analysis on predictability highlights the fact that our measures are not related to tra-
ditional macroeconomic or Fama-French firm-specific factors, and are capturing connections
16These results are also consistent if we consider indexes of hedge funds, broker/dealers, banks, and
insurers. The results are available in Online Appendix O.2.
17Starting in the October 2002–September 2005 period, the overall system and individual financial-
institution 36-month rolling-window autocorrelations became positive and remained positive through the
end of the sample.
18Network diagrams for residual returns (from a market-model regression against the S&P 500) are avail-
able upon request.
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beyond the usual common drivers of asset-return fluctuations.
For completeness, in Table 4 we present summary statistics for the other network mea-
sures proposed in Section 3.2, including the various counting measures of the number of con-
nections, and measures of centrality. These metrics provide somewhat different but largely
consistent perspectives on how the Granger-causality network of banks, broker/dealers, hedge
funds, and insurers changed over the past 15 years.19
19To compare these measures with the classical measure of correlation, see Online Appendix O.4.
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In addition, we explore whether our Granger-causality-network measures are related to
firm characteristics for two sub-periods: October 2002 to September 2005 and July 2004 to
June 2007. We select these two sub-periods to provide examples of high and low levels of
the number of connections, respectively, as Figure 4 shows. We conduct a rank regression
of all Granger-causality-network measures on firm-specific characteristics such as size, lever-
age, liquidity, and industry dummies for these sub-periods.20 The results are inconclusive.
For the October 2002 to September 2005 period, we find that size is negatively related to
the In-from-Other measure, suggesting that smaller firms are more likely to be affected by
firms from other industries. Market beta positively affects the Out-to-Other measure. The
first order autocorrelation is significantly associated with the In+Out measure. However,
these results are not robust for the July 2004 to June 2007 period. As a result, we do not
find any consistent relationships between the Granger-causality-network measures and firm
characteristics.
We explore the out-of-sample performance of our Granger-causality measures (individ-
ually and jointly with our PCAS measures) including firm characteristics during the crisis
periods in Section 6.
5.3 Nonlinear Granger-causality tests
Table 5 presents p-values of nonlinear Granger-causality likelihood ratio tests (see Section
3.3) for the monthly residual returns indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds
over the two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. Given the larger number of parameters
in nonlinear Granger-causality tests as compared to linear Granger-causality tests, we use
monthly indexes instead of the returns of individual financial institutions and two longer
sample periods. Index returns are constructed by value-weighting the monthly returns of
individual institutions as described in Section 4. Residual returns are obtained from regres-
sions of index returns against the S&P 500 returns. Index results for linear Granger-causality
tests are presented in Online Appendix O.2. This analysis shows that causal relationships
are even stronger if we take into account both the level of the mean and the level of risk that
these financial institutions may face, i.e., their volatilities. The presence of strong nonlinear
Granger-causality relationships is detected in both samples. Moreover, in the 2001–2008
20We thank the referee for suggesting this line of inquiry. Rank regressions are available from the authors
upon request.
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sample, we find that almost all financial institutions were affected by the past level of risk
of other financial institutions.21
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Table 5: p-values of nonlinear Granger-causality likelihood ratio tests for the monthly resid-
ual returns indexes (from a market-model regression against S&P 500 returns) of Banks,
Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds for two sub-samples: January 1994 to December 2000,
and January 2001 to December 2008. Statistics that are significant at the 5% level are shown
in bold.
Note that linear Granger-causality tests provide causality relationships based only on the
means, whereas nonlinear Granger-causality tests also take into account the linkages among
the volatilities of financial institutions. With nonlinear Granger-causality tests we find more
interconnectedness between financial institutions compared to linear Granger-causality re-
sults, which supports the endogenous volatility feedback relationship proposed by Danielsson,
Shin, and Zigrand (2011). The nonlinear Granger-causality results are also consistent with
the results of the linear Granger-causality tests in two respects: the connections are increas-
ing over time, and even after controlling for the S&P 500, shocks to one financial institution
are likely to spread to all other financial institutions.
6 Out-of-sample results
One important application of any systemic risk measure is to provide early warning signals
to regulators and the public. To this end, we explore the out-of-sample performance of our
PCAS and Granger-causality measures in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. In particular,
21We consider only pairwise Granger causality due to significant multicollinearity among the returns.
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following the approach of Acharya et al. (2011), we consider two 36-month samples, October
2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007, as estimation periods for our measures, and
the period from July 2007–December 2008 as the “out-of-sample” period encompassing the
Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. The two sample periods (October 2002–September 2005 and
July 2004–June 2007) have been selected to provide two different examples characterized by
high and low levels of connectedness in the sample. In the October 2002–September 2005
period, the Cumulative Risk Fraction measure hn is statistically larger than the threshold H
(as shown in Appendix A) and the number of Granger-causality connections are statistically
different than zero as shown by Figure 4. In the July 2004–June 2007, hn is statistically
smaller than H and the number of Granger-causality connections is not statistically different
from zero. In Section 6.3, we show that even with the time-varying levels of significance
during this period, both measures still yield useful out-of-sample indications of the recent
financial crisis.
6.1 PCAS results
When the Cumulative Risk Fraction, hn, is large, this means that we observe a significant
amount of connectedness among financial institutions. To identify when this percentage is
large, i.e., to identify a threshold H , we use a simulation approach described in Appendix A.
We find that h1 (i.e., when n=1) should be larger than 33.74% (i.e., H is 33.74%) to exhibit
a large degree of connectedness (where n is the fraction of eigenvalues considered, as defined
in Section 3.1). When n=10 and 20, H is estimated to be 74.48% and 91.67%, respectively.
For each of the four financial and insurance categories we consider the top 25 financial
institutions as determined by the average AUM for hedge funds and average market capital-
ization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered, yielding
100 entities in all. These financial institutions are ranked from 1 to 100 according to their
PCAS.
To evaluate the out-of-sample performance of PCAS, we first compute the maximum
percentage financial loss (Max%Loss) suffered by each of the 100 institutions during the
crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008.22 We then rank all financial institutions from
22The maximum percentage loss for a financial institution is defined to be the difference between the
market capitalization of the institution (fund size in the case of hedge funds) at the end of June 2007 and
the minimum market capitalization during the period from July 2007 to December 2008 divided by the
market capitalization or fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. An additional loss metric is the
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1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss
rankings on the institutions’ PCAS rankings. We consider PCAS 1, PCAS 1–10, and PCAS
1–20 measures as reported in (8). The results are reported in Table 6 for two samples:
October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression, we report the
β coefficient, the t-statistic, p-value, and the Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation coefficient.
We find that companies more exposed to the overall risk of the system, i.e., those with
larger PCAS measures, were more likely to suffer significant losses during the recent crisis.
In this respect, the PCAS measure is similar to the MES measure proposed by Acharya et
al. (2011). Institutions that have the largest exposures to the 20 largest principal components
(the most contemporaneously interconnected) are those that lose the most during the crisis.
As Table 6 shows for the October 2002 to September 2005 period, the rank correlation
indicates a strict relationship between PCAS and losses during the recent Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009. The beta coefficients are all significant at the 5% level, showing that PCAS
correctly identifies firms that will be more affected during crises, i.e., will face larger losses.
However, the percentage of volatility explained by the principal components decreased in
July 2004–June 2007, consistent with Figure 1a. In this case, there is not a strict relationship
between the exposure of a single institution to principal components and the losses it may
face during the crisis. We have repeated the analysis using the PCAS measure described
in (8) where σ2i and σ
2
S are estimated using a GARCH(1,1) model, and the results are
qualitatively unchanged.
6.2 Granger-causality results
We use the same estimation and out-of-sample periods to evaluate our Granger-causality-
network measures as in Section 6.1, and for each financial institution, we compute 8 Granger-
causality-network measures. As before, for each of the four categories of financial institutions,
we consider the top 25 as determined by the average AUM for hedge funds and average market
capitalization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered,
yielding 100 entities in all. As with the PCAS measure, we rank financial institutions from
1 to 100 according to Granger-causality-network measures.23
maximum dollar loss, Max$Loss, however, this is highly driven by size. We do believe that size is a relevant
factor for systemic risk, thus we chose to include the largest 100 financial institutions in our analysis. We
concentrate on Max%Loss in order to capture additional drivers of connectedness.
23The institution with the highest value of a measure is ranked 1 and the one with the lowest is ranked
100. However, for the Closeness measure, the ranking is reversed: an institution with the lowest Closeness
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Coeff t-stat p-value Kendall 
PCAS 1 0.35 3.46 0.00 0.25
PCAS 1-10 0.29 2.83 0.01 0.22
PCAS 1-20 0.29 2.83 0.01 0.22
PCAS 1 0.11 1.10 0.28 0.09
PCAS 1-10 0.07 0.73 0.47 0.06
PCAS 1-20 0.09 0.91 0.37 0.07
July 2004 to June 2007
Measure
Max % Loss
October 2002 to September 2005
Table 6: Regression coefficients, t-statistics, p-values, and Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation
coefficients for regressions of Max%Loss loss on PCAS 1, PCAS 1–10, and PCAS 1–20.
The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount
of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial
institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total
fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. These measures are calculated over
two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Statistics that are
significant at the 5% level are displayed in bold.
To evaluate the predictive power of these rankings, we repeated the out-of-sample analysis
done with PCAS measures by first ranking all financial institutions from 1 to 100 according
to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss rankings on the in-
stitutions’ Granger-causality-network rankings. The results are reported in Table 7 for two
samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression, we
report the β coefficient, the t-statistic, p-value, and the Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation
coefficient.
We find that Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out-Other, Closeness, and Eigenvector Centrality
are significant determinants of the Max%Loss variable.
Based on the Closeness and Eigenvector Centrality measures, financial institutions that
are highly connected are the ones that suffered the most during the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009. However, the institutions that declined the most during the Crisis were the ones that
greatly affected other institutions—both their own and other types—and not the institutions
that were affected by others. Both Out and Out-to-Other are significant, whereas In and
In-from-Other are not.
measure is ranked 1, and the one with the highest is 100.
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Coeff t-stat p-value Kendall 
# of "In" Connections 0.03 0.25 0.80 0.02
# of "Out" Connections 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.16
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.16 1.51 0.13 0.11
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.12 1.15 0.25 0.09
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.32 3.11 0.00 0.22
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.15
Closeness 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.16
Eigenvector Centrality 0.24 2.31 0.02 0.16
# of "In" Connections -0.01 -0.07 0.94 -0.01
# of "Out" Connections 0.25 2.53 0.01 0.20
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.19 1.89 0.06 0.13
# of "In-from-Other" Connections -0.02 -0.19 0.85 -0.02
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.17 1.68 0.10 0.13
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.09 0.84 0.41 0.06
Closeness 0.25 2.53 0.01 0.20
Eigenvector Centrality 0.24 2.44 0.02 0.17
July 2004 to June 2007
October 2002 to September 2005
Max % Loss
Measure
Table 7: Regression coefficients, t-statistics, p-values, and Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation
coefficients for regressions of Max%Loss loss on Granger-causality-network measures. The
maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of
the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial
institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total
fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. These measures are calculated over
two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Statistics that are
significant at the 5% level are displayed in bold.
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6.3 Combined measures
To evaluate the predictive power of PCA and Granger-causality-network measures, we first
compute the maximum percentage financial loss (Max%Loss) suffered by each of the 100
institutions during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. We then rank all
financial institutions from 1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate
regressions for Max%Loss rankings on the institutions’ connectedness rankings. The results
are reported in Table 8 for two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June
2007. For each regression, we report the β coefficient, the t-statistic, p-value, and the Kendall
(1938) τ rank-correlation coefficient.
We find that Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out-Other, Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and
PCAS are significant determinants of the Max%Loss variable. Based on the Closeness and
Eigenvector Centrality measures, financial institutions that are systemically important and
are very interconnected are the ones that suffered the most during the Financial Crisis of
2007–2009. However, the institutions that declined the most during the Crisis were the
ones that greatly affected other institutions—both their own and other types—and not the
institutions that were affected by others. Both Out and Out-to-Other are significant, whereas
In and In-from-Other are not. The top names in the Out and Out-to-Other categories include
Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Federal National Mortgage Association, UBS,
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Wachovia, Bank New York, American International Group, and
Washington Mutual.24
In addition to causal relationships, contemporaneous correlations between financial insti-
tutions served as predictors of the crisis. Based on the significance of the PCAS 1 measure,25
companies that were more correlated with other companies and were more exposed to the
overall risk of the system, were more likely to suffer significant losses during the recent cri-
sis.26 As early as 2002–2005, important connections among these financial institutions were
established that later contributed to the Financial Crisis and the subsequent decline of many
of them.27
24The top 20 ranked financial institutions with respect to the Out-to-Other measure are listed in Table
A.1 in Appendix D.
25PCAS 1–10 and PCAS 1–20 are also significant. The same applies if we calculate PCAS 1, PCAS 1-10,
or PCAS 1-20 using GARCH(1,1) model. Results are available from the authors upon request.
26The significance of the PCAS measures decreased in July 2004–June 2007. This is consistent with the
result in Figure 1 where, for the monthly return indexes, the first principal component captured less return
variation during this time period than in the October 2002–September 2005 period.
27We also consider time periods just before and after October 2002–September 2005 that show a signifi-
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Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 18.57 1.63 11.76 1.10 12.76 1.18 17.49 1.55 9.55 0.90 12.78 1.18 11.76 1.10 12.01 1.11
Leverage 0.19 1.78 0.22 2.13 0.21 1.99 0.18 1.71 0.25 2.40 0.21 1.97 0.22 2.13 0.22 2.11
PCAS 1 0.40 3.07 0.33 2.61 0.37 2.88 0.39 2.99 0.27 2.06 0.34 2.64 0.33 2.61 0.34 2.63
Size 0.07 0.53 0.04 0.31 0.07 0.58 0.08 0.61 0.05 0.37 0.09 0.67 0.04 0.31 0.04 0.30
ρ1 -0.13 -1.24 -0.12 -1.22 -0.17 -1.61 -0.14 -1.28 -0.11 -1.04 -0.16 -1.55 -0.12 -1.22 -0.10 -1.02
# of "In" Connections 0.04 0.35
# of "Out" Connections 0.25 2.50
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.22 2.12
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.07 0.62
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.32 2.98
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.23 2.12
Closeness 0.25 2.50
Eigenvector Centrality 0.22 2.18
R-square 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.23
Intercept 19.03 1.35 3.91 0.29 -1.20 -0.08 20.27 1.44 4.70 0.33 6.71 0.44 3.91 0.29 10.15 0.77
Leverage 0.18 1.71 0.24 2.28 0.22 2.11 0.18 1.71 0.23 2.18 0.21 1.98 0.24 2.28 0.21 1.99
PCAS 1 0.20 1.44 0.20 1.54 0.28 2.06 0.20 1.42 0.23 1.73 0.25 1.81 0.20 1.54 0.20 1.49
Size -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.20 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06
ρ1 0.17 1.51 0.18 1.75 0.21 1.97 0.16 1.47 0.18 1.70 0.20 1.82 0.18 1.75 0.13 1.22
# of "In" Connections 0.05 0.49
# of "Out" Connections 0.30 3.03
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.29 2.83
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.03 0.30
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.26 2.47
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.20 1.79
Closeness 0.30 3.03
Eigenvector Centrality 0.26 2.57
R-square 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.15
October 2002 to September 2005
July 2004 to June 2007
Table 8: Parameter estimates of a multivariate rank regression of Max%Loss for each fi-
nancial institution during July 2007–December 2008 on PCAS 1, leverage, size, first order
autocorrelation, and Granger-causality-network measures. The maximum percentage loss
(Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative
decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–
December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the
end of June 2007. PCAS 1, leverage, size, first order autocorrelation, and Granger-causality-
network measures are calculated over October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June
2007. Parameter estimates that are significant at the 5% level are shown in bold.
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It is possible that some of our results can be explained by leverage effects.28 Leverage
has the effect of a magnifying glass, expanding small profit opportunities into larger ones,
but also expanding small losses into larger losses. And when unexpected adverse market
conditions reduce the value of the corresponding collateral, such events often trigger forced
liquidations of large positions over short periods of time. Such efforts to reduce leverage
can lead to systemic events as we have witnessed during the recent crisis. Since leverage
information is not directly available, for publicly traded banks, broker/dealers, and insurers,
we estimate their leverage as the ratio of Total Assets minus Equity Market Value to Equity
Market Value. For hedge funds, we use reported average leverage for a given time period.
Using these crude proxies, we find that estimated leverage is positively related to future
losses (Max%Loss). We also adjusted for asset size (as determined by AUM for hedge funds
and market capitalization for broker/dealers, insurers, and banks) and the results are not
altered by including this additional regressor. In all regressions, asset size is not significant
for Max%Loss. This may be due to the fact that our analysis is concentrated on large
financial institutions (the top 25 for each sector).
Leverage is also problematic, largely because of illiquidity—in the event of a margin
call on a leveraged portfolio, forced liquidations may cause even larger losses and additional
margin calls, ultimately leading to a series of insolvencies and defaults as financial institutions
withdraw credit. Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return
autocorrelation to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure of a given financial institution, hence
the multivariate regression of Table 8 is estimated by including the first-order autocorrelation
of monthly returns as an additional regressor.
These robustness checks lead us to conclude that, in both sample periods (October
2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007), our results are robust—measures based
on Granger causality and principal components analysis seem to be predictive of the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007–2009.
We also investigate the relationship between our measures of connectedness and the
realized tail risk measured by correlation between each firm and the financial system during
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. The analysis shows that our measures of contemporaneous
connections between financial institutions, PCAS 1, 1–10, and 1–20 are all highly related to
cant number of interconnections, and the results are still significant for Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out-Other,
Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and PCAS measures.
28We thank Lasse Pedersen and Mark Carey for suggesting this line of inquiry.
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this realized tail risk (rank regression p-values equal to zero). However, Granger-causality-
network measures are not consistently correlated with tail risk, indicating that they are
capturing the spillover of losses that are not contemporaneous, but contribute to losses of
financial institutions in the wake of systemic shocks.29
Finally, we consider spillover effects by measuring the performance of firms highly con-
nected to the best-performing and worst-performing firms. Specifically, during the crisis
period we rank 100 firms by performance and construct quintiles from this ranking. Using
the “Out” measure of connectedness, we find that firms that have the highest number of
significant connections to the worst-performing firms (1st quintile) do worse than firms that
are less connected to these poor performers. More specifically, firms in the 2nd quintile
exhibit 119 connections with the 1st quintile, and those that have the smallest number of
connections (69) with the 1st quintile perform the best, i.e., they are in the 5th quintile.
This pattern suggests that there are, indeed, spillover effects in performance that are being
captured by Granger-causality networks.
7 Conclusion
The financial system has become considerably more complex over the past two decades
as the separation between hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and
broker/dealers have blurred thanks to financial innovation and deregulation. While such
complexity is an inevitable consequence of competition and economic growth, they are ac-
companied by certain consequences, including much greater interdependence.
In this paper, we propose to quantify that interdependence using principal components
analysis and Granger-causality networks. Principal components analysis provides a broad
view of connections among all four groups of financial institutions, and Granger-causality
networks capture the intricate web of pairwise statistical relations among individual firms in
the finance and insurance industries. Using monthly returns data for hedge-fund indexes and
portfolios of publicly traded banks, insurers, and broker/dealers, we show that such indirect
measures are indeed capable of picking up periods of market dislocation and distress, and
have promising out-of-sample characteristics. These measures seem to capture unique and
different facets of the finance and insurance sectors. For example, over the recent sample
29Results are available from the authors upon request.
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period, our empirical results suggest that the banking and insurance sectors may be even
more important sources of connectedness than other parts, which is consistent with the
anecdotal evidence from the recent financial crisis. The illiquidity of bank and insurance
assets, coupled with fact that banks and insurers are not designed to withstand rapid and
large losses (unlike hedge funds), make these sectors a natural repository for systemic risk.
The same feedback effects and dynamics apply to bank and insurance capital requirements
and risk management practices based on VaR, which are intended to ensure the soundness
of individual financial institutions, but may amplify aggregate fluctuations if they are widely
adopted. For example, if the riskiness of assets held by one bank increases due to heightened
market volatility, to meet its VaR requirements the bank will have to sell some of these risky
assets. This liquidation may restore the bank’s financial soundness, but if all banks engage
in such liquidations at the same time, a devastating positive feedback loop may be generated
unintentionally. These endogenous feedback effects can have significant implications for the
returns of financial institutions, including autocorrelation, increased correlation, changes in
volatility, Granger causality, and, ultimately, increased systemic risk, as our empirical results
seem to imply.
As long as human behavior is coupled with free enterprise, it is unrealistic to expect that
market crashes, manias, panics, collapses, and fraud will ever be completely eliminated from
our capital markets. The best hope for avoiding some of the most disruptive consequences
of such crises is to develop methods for measuring, monitoring, and anticipating them. By
using a broad array of tools for gauging the topology of the financial network, we stand a
better chance of identifying “black swans” when they are still cygnets.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we provide robustness checks and more detailed formulations and deriva-
tions for our connectedness measures. We conduct PCA significance tests in Section A. Tests
for statistical significance of Granger-causality-network measures are in Section B. Section
C provides some technical details for nonlinear Granger-causality tests. Finally, Section D
provides a list of systemically important institutions based on our measures.
A PCA significance tests
For the PCA analysis we employ a 36-month rolling estimate of the principal components
over the 1994–2008 sample period. According to Figure 1 we observe significant changes
around August 1998, September 2005, and November 2008 for the first principal component.
Below we devise a test for structural changes in the estimates within the PCA framework
across all sample periods to test the significance of these changes.
Defining the Total Risk of the system as Ω =
∑N
k=1 λk and Cumulative Risk at n eigen-
value as ωn =
∑n
k=1 λk, the Cumulative Risk Fraction is:
ωn
Ω
≡ hn (A.1)
where N is the total number of eigenvalues, λk is the k-th eigenvalue, and hn is the fraction
of total risk explained by the first n eigenvalues.
In our analysis we consider 100 institutions and 145 overlapping 36-month time periods.
Therefore, h1 is the fraction of total risk corresponding to the first principal component
for each period. For each of the 145 periods, we calculate h1, and select the time periods
corresponding to the lowest quintile of the h1 measure (the 20% of the 145 periods having
the lowest h1). We refer to the mean of the lowest quintile h1 measures as the threshold H .
Excluding periods with h1 values above the lowest quintile, we averaged elements of
covariance matrix over the remaining periods obtaining an average covariance matrix, which
we used in simulating 100 multivariate normal series for 1, 000 times.
For each simulation we compute hn for each integer n and compute the mean, 95%, 99%,
and 99.5% confidence intervals of the simulated distributions. We then test whether hn,
the fraction of total risk explained by the first n eigenvalues, for each rolling-window time
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periods considered in the analysis is statistically different by checking if it is outside the
significance bounds of the simulated distribution.
Figure A.1 presents results for the following 36-month rolling periods: September 1995–
August 1998, October 2002–September 2005, December 2005–November 2008, February
1994–January 1997, and April 1995–March 1998. For September 1995–August 1998, October
2002–September 2005, and December 2005–November 2008 we observe statistically signifi-
cant changes; however, not for the April 1995–March 1998 and February 1994–January 1997
periods. This is consistent with our analysis in Figure 1 where we observe significant changes
around August 1998, September 2005, and November 2008 for the first principal component.
B Significance of Granger-causality network measures
In Figure 4 we graph the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible connec-
tions we observe in the real data at the 5% significance level (in black) against 0.055, the
95th percentile of the simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal re-
lationships (in red). We find that for the 1998–1999, 2002–2004, and 2007-2008 periods, the
number of causal relationships observed far exceeds the number obtained purely by chance.
Therefore, for these time-periods we can affirm that the observed causal relationships are
statistically significant.30
To test whether Granger-causal relationships between individual financial and insurance
institutions are due to chance, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation analysis. Specifically,
assuming independence among financial institutions, we randomly simulate 100 time series
representing the 100 financial institutions’ returns in our sample, and test for Granger causal-
ity at the 5% level among all possible causal relationships (as in the empirical analysis in
Section 5.2, there are a total of 9,900 possible causal relationships), and record the number
of significant connections. We repeat this exercise 500 times, and the resulting distribution
is given in Figure A.2a. This distribution is centered at 0.052, which represents the frac-
tion of significant connections among all possible connections under the null hypothesis of
no statistical relation among any of the financial institutions. The area between 0.049 and
0.055 captures 90% of the simulations. Therefore, if we observe more than 5.5% of significant
relationships in the real data, our results are unlikely to be the result of type I error.
30The results are similar for the 1%-level of significance.
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Figure A.1: The fraction of total risk explained by the first 36 principal components. The
mean of the lowest quintile and the 95% and the 99% confidence intervals of the simu-
lated distributions are graphed. For the simulated distributions we exclude periods with
h1 values above the lowest quintile. Tests of significance of the differences in the Cu-
mulative Risk Fraction are presented for the following 36-month rolling periods: Septem-
ber 1995–August 1998, October 2002–September 2005, December 2005–November 2008,
February 1994–January 1997, and April 1995–March 1998.
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Figure A.2: Histograms of simulated Granger-causal relationships between financial insti-
tutions. 100 time series representing 100 financial institutions’s returns are simulated and
tested for Granger casuality at the 5% level. The number of significant connections out of
all possible connections is calculated for 500 simulations. In histogram (a), independence
among financial institutions is assumed. In histogram (b), contemporaneous correlation
among financial institutions, captured through the dependence on the S&P 500 is allowed.
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We also conduct a similar simulation exercise under the null hypothesis of contempo-
raneously correlated returns with the S&P 500, but no causal relations among financial
institutions. The results are essentially the same, as seen in the histogram in Figure A.2b:
the histogram is centered around 0.052, and the area between 0.048 and 0.055 captures 90%
of the simulations.
The following provides a step-by-step procedure for identifying Granger-causal linkages:
Because we wish to retain the contemporaneous dependence structure among the individ-
ual time series, our working hypothesis is that the dependence arises from a common factor,
i.e., the S&P 500. Specifically, to simulate 100 time series (one for each financial institution),
we start with the time-series data for these institutions and filter out heteroskedastic effects
with a GARCH(1,1) process, as in the linear Granger-causality analysis of Section 5.2. We
then regress the standardized residuals on the returns of the S&P 500 index: RS&P500t :
R˜it = αi + βiR
S&P500
t + σiǫ
i
t , i = 1, . . . , 100 , ǫ
i
t IID N (0, 1) (A.2)
and store the parameter estimates αˆi, βˆi, and σˆi, to calibrate our simulation’s data-generating
process, where “IID” denotes independently and identically distributed random variables.
Next, we simulate 36 monthly returns (corresponding to the 3-year period in our sample)
of the common factor and the residual returns of the 100 hypothetical financial institutions.
Returns of the common factor come from a normal random variable with mean and standard
deviation set equal to that of the S&P 500 return, Y S&P500jt . The residuals η
i
jt are IID standard
normal random variables. We repeat this simulation 500 times and obtain the resulting
population of our simulated series Y ijt:
Y ijt = αˆi + βˆiY
S&P500
jt + σˆiη
i
jt , i = 1, . . . , 100 , j = 1, . . . , 500, t = 1....36 (A.3)
For each simulation j, we perform our Granger-causality analysis and calculate the num-
ber of significant connections, and compute the empirical distribution of the various test
statistics which can then be used to assess the statistical significance of our empirical find-
ings.
In summary, using several methods we show that our Granger-causality results are not
due to chance.
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C Nonlinear Granger causality
In this section we provide a framework for conducting nonlinear Granger-causality tests.
Let us assume that Yt = (St, Zt) is a first-order Markov process (or Markov chain) with
transition probabilities:
P (Yt|Yt−1, ..., Y0) = P (Yt|Yt−1) = P (St, Zt|St−1, Zt−1). (A.4)
Then, all the information from the past history of the process, which is relevant for the
transition probabilities in time t, is represented by the previous state of the process, i.e., the
state in time t−1. Under the additional assumption that transition probabilities do not vary
over time, the process is defined as a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities,
summarized in the transition matrix Π.
We can further decompose the joint transition probabilities as follows:
Π = P (Yt|Yt−1) = P (St, Zt|St−1, Zt−1) = P (St|Zt, St−1, Zt−1)× P (Zt|St−1, Zt−1). (A.5)
and thus define the Granger non-causality for a Markov chain as:
Definition 1 Strong one-step ahead non-causality for a Markov chain with stationary tran-
sition probabilities, i.e., Zt−1 does not strongly cause St given St−1 if:
∀t P (St|St−1, Zt−1) = P (St|St−1) . (A.6)
Similarly, St−1 does not strongly cause Zt given Zt−1 if:
∀t P (Zt|Zt−1, St−1) = P (Zt|Zt−1) . (A.7)
The Granger non-causality tests in this framework are based on the transition matrix Π that
can be represented using an alternative parametrization. The transition matrix Π can, in
fact, be represented through a logistic function. More specifically, when we consider two-state
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Markov chains, the joint probability of St and Zt can be represented as follows:
P (St, Zt|St−1, Zt−1) = P (St|Zt, St−1, Zt−1)× P (Zt|St−1, Zt−1)
=
exp(α′Vt)
1 + exp(α′Vt)
×
exp(β ′Ut)
1 + exp(β′Ut)
, (A.8)
where
Vt = (1, Zt)
′ ⊗ (1, St−1)
′ ⊗ (1, Zt−1)
′ (A.9)
= (1, Zt−1, St−1, St−1Zt−1, Zt, ZtZt−1, ZtSt−1, ZtZt−1St−1)
′,
the vectors α and β have dimensions (8× 1) and (4× 1), respectively,
Ut = (1, St−1, Zt−1, Zt−1St−1)
′ = (1, Zt−1)
′ ⊗ (1, St−1)
′, (A.10)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Ut is an invertible linear transformation of:
U⋆t = [(1− St−1) (1− Zt−1) , St−1 (1− Zt−1) , (1− St−1)Zt−1, St−1Zt−1]
′ , (A.11)
that represents the four mutually exclusive dummies representing the four states of the
process at time t−1, i.e., [00, 10, 01, 11]′. Given this parametrization, the conditions for
strong one-step ahead non-causality are easily determined as restrictions on the parameter
space.
To impose Granger non-causality (as in Definition 1), it is necessary that the dependence
on St−1 disappears in the second term of the decomposition. Thus, it is simply required that
the parameters of the terms of Ut depending on St−1 are equal to zero:
HS;Z (S ; Z) : β2 = β4 = 0 . (A.12)
Under HS;Z , St−1 does not strongly cause one-step ahead Zt given Zt−1. The terms St−1
and St−1Zt−1 are excluded from Ut, hence P (Zt|St−1, Zt−1) = P (Zt|Zt−1).
Both hypotheses can be tested in a bivariate regime-switching model using a Wald test
or a Likelihood ratio test. In the empirical analysis, bivariate regime-switching models have
been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Hamilton’s filter (Hamilton (1994)) and in
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all our estimations we compute the robust covariance matrix estimators (often known as the
sandwich estimator) to calculate the standard errors (see Huber (1981) and White (1982)).
D Systemically important financial institutions
Another robustness check of our connectedness measures is to explore their implications for
individual financial institutions. In this section we provide a simple comparison between the
rankings of individual institutions according to our measures with the rankings based on
subsequent financial losses. Consider first the Out-to-Other Granger-causality-network mea-
sure, estimated over the October 2002–September 2005 sample period. We rank all financial
institutions based on this measure, and the 20 highest-scoring institutions are presented in
Table A.1, along with the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on the maximum percentage
loss (Max%Loss) during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008.31 We find an
overlap of 7 financial institutions between these two rankings.
In Table 8 we showed that in addition to Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCAS were also
significant in predicting Max%Loss. Therefore, it is possible to sharpen our prediction by
ranking financial institutions according to a simple aggregation of all three measures. To
that end, we multiply each institution’s ranking according to Out-to-Other, Leverage, and
PCAS 1–20 by their corresponding beta coefficients from Table 8, sum these products, and
then re-rank all financial institutions based on this aggregate sum. The 20 highest-scoring
institutions according to this aggregate measure, estimated using date from October 2002–
September 2005, are presented in Table A.1. In this case we find an overlap of 12 financial
institutions (among the top 20) and most of the rest (among the top 30) with financial
institutions ranked on Max%Loss. This improvement in correspondence and reduction in
“false positives” suggest that our aggregate ranking may be useful in identifying systemically
important entities.
31The first 11 financial institutions in Max%Loss ranking were bankrupt, therefore, representing the same
Max%Loss equalled to 100%.
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Out-to-Other Aggregate Measure Max Percentage Loss
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW DEUTSCHE BANK AG Perry Partners LP
PROGRESSIVE CORP OH U B S AG EDWARDS A G INC
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN Canyon Value Realization (Cayman) Ltd (A)
STEWART W P & CO LTD Tomasetti Investment LP C I T GROUP INC NEW
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC Tomasetti Investment LP
INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC NEW C I G N A CORP BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC
CITIGROUP INC JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW ACE LTD
U B S AG CITIGROUP INC LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC NEW WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP IN Kingate Global Ltd USD Shares
AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP
Kingate Global Ltd USD Shares BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN
T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC ACE LTD RADIAN GROUP INC
JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW C I T GROUP INC NEW AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
X L CAPITAL LTD WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC
M B N A CORP RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC STEWART W P & CO LTD
M B I A INC BANK OF AMERICA CORP M G I C INVESTMENT CORP WIS
Graham Global Investment K4D-10 STEWART W P & CO LTD WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC PROGRESSIVE CORP OH HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN
ACE LTD HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN X L CAPITAL LTD
Table A.1: Granger-causality-network-based measures for a sample of 100 financial insti-
tutions consisting of the 25 largest banks, broker/dealers, insurers, and hedge funds (as
determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for bro-
ker/dealers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for the sample period
from October 2002 to September 2005. Only the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on
Out-to-Other and aggregate measures are displayed. The aggregate measure is an aggre-
gation of the Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCAS 1-20 measures. The maximum percentage
loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative
decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–
December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at
the end of June 2007. All connections are based on Granger-causality-network statistics at
the 5% level of statistical significance.
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